Bugs as Deviant Behavior: A General Approach to Inferring Errors in Systems Code

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Introduction

- Bugs are a problem
- Difficult to identify in systems code
 - Rules are unclear
 - Correctness is unknown
- Methods for identifying bugs:
 - Type systems
 - Specifications
 - High-level compilation
 - Dynamic invariant inference



Deviant Behavior

- If correctness rules are known, we can check them with an extended compiler
 - Manually finding rules is difficult
 - Want to extract it automatically, but how?
- Find incorrect behavior without knowing correct behavior
 - Cross check statements in code
 - Identify contradiction
 - Common behavior is probably correct behavior (hopefully)



- Automatically generate beliefs
 - Extract beliefs from the source code
 - Compare beliefs in different sections
 - Contradictions in beliefs
 - May be an error
 - May be a coincidence
 - May also identify sections of programmer confusion
- Two types of beliefs:
 - MUST beliefs
 - MAY beliefs

MUST beliefs

- Directly implied by code
- Check using internal consistency
- Contradiction of MUST beliefs directly implies an error
- Examples:
 - $\star x = a / b$;
 - b is non-zero
 - *ptr
 - ptr is not null
 - unlock(lck)
 - lck has been acquired



MAY beliefs

- Observed features, suggested by code
- May be a coincidence, treat as MUST beliefs
- E.g. ordering
 - 'a();' followed by 'b();' MAY mean a() and b() must be paired
 - Enclosure in locks may mean locking is required
- Lock followed by use of a and b, b may be a coincidence
- Separate coincidences from valid beliefs using probability



- May Beliefs (cont'd)
 - Use statistical analysis to filter out coincidences

$$z(n,e) = (e/n - p_0)/\sqrt{(p_0 * (1 - p_0)/n)}$$

- Measures the amount of deviation in beliefs
- Error cases have some number of counter-examples
- Also useful to rank z(n, n e)
 - Inversion shows beliefs that are almost never true
 - Such beliefs may also be errors
- Stop when the number of false pos is too high



Null Pointers

- Three possible beliefs for a pointer
 - Null, not-null, or unknown
- Checker rules
 - A dereference adds not-null to set of beliefs
 - Error if the previous belief set was null
 - A comparison check implies two things
 - Before the comparison the belief is unknown
 - After the comparison (ptr == null), belief is null in true branch and non-null in false branch



Null Pointers

■ Check-then-use (79 errors 26 false pos)

■ Use-then-check (102 bugs, 4 false)

```
/* 2.4.7: drivers/char/mxser.c */
struct mxser_struct *info = tty->driver_data;
unsigned flags;
if(!tty || !info->xmit_buf)
    return 0;
```



Spreading Beliefs, Lock Inference

```
1: lock 1; // Lock
2: int a, b;
                  // Variables potentially
                  // protected by 1
 3: void foo() {
4:
      lock(1): // Enter critical section
5:
      a = a + b; // MAY: a,b protected by 1
      unlock(1); // Exit critical section
6:
       b = b + 1; // MUST: b not protected by 1
8: }
9: void bar() {
10: lock(1);
11: a = a + 1; // MAY: a protected by 1
12:
       unlock(1);
13: }
14: void baz() {
15:
       a = a + 1; // MAY: a protected by 1
16: unlock(1);
17:
      b = b - 1; // MUST: b not protected by 1
      a = a / 5; // MUST: a not protected by 1
18:
19: }
```

EECS 443 - Advanced Operating Systems



Redundancy

Contradiction/redundant checks(24 bugs, 10 false)

```
/* 2.4.7/drivers/video/tdfxfb.c */
fb_info.regbase_virt = ioremap_nocache(...);
if(!fb_info.regbase_virt)
    return -ENXIO;
fb_info.bufbase_virt = ioremap_nocache(...);
/* [META: meant fb_info.bufbase_virt!] */
if(!fb_info.regbase_virt) {
    iounmap(fb_info.regbase_virt);
```

- Assume code should be useful
 - Useless statements identify areas of confusion

```
/* 2.4.5-ac8/net/appletalk/aarp.c */
da.s_node = sa.s_node;
da.s_net = da.s_net;
```



Security Holes

- Kernel pointers are safe, user pointers are not
 - Any violation is a security hole
 - How to find user pointers?
 - Use a similar analysis to finding null pointers
- *ptr implies a non-null pointer
 - copyin(ptr)/copyout(ptr) suggests a user pointer
 - Belief is propagated throughout code
- Found 24 security bugs in Linux, 18 in OpenBSD



Security Holes Example

- rt is treated as a user pointer, but is dereferenced before it is checked
- Area of confusion for programmer
- 1:1 ratio of false positives



Routine Failure

- Kernel code must check for failure
 - Assumptions for checker:
 - Assume all functions can fail
 - If the result of a function is ignored or used without checks, "error"
 - ❖ If the result of a function is checked before use, "checked"
 - A high ratio of check to error messages implies checking is necessary



The Worst Error...

```
/* ipc/shm.c:map_zero_setup */
if (IS_ERR(shp = seg_alloc(...)))
    return PTR_ERR(shp);

/* 2.4.0-test9:ipc/shm.c:newseg
    NOTE: checking 'seg_alloc' */
if (!(shp = seg_alloc(...)))
    return -ENOMEM;
id = shm_addid(shp);

int ipc_addid(..., struct kern_ipc_perm* new)
    new->cuid = new->uid = current->euid;
    new->gid = new->cgid = current->egid;
    ids->entries[id].p = new;
```



Deallocation Errors

- Use-after-free errors can cause heavy damage
 - Want to keep track of "free" calls
 - Must identify undocumented free functions
 - Assume all functions contain free

```
foo(p); foo(p); foo(p); bar(p); bar(p); bar(p); p = x; p = x;
```

- foo has fewer deviations than bar, bar has higher rank for error detection
- Error may be the caused by an unexpected return path
- Found 23 free errors, 11 false pos



Deallocation Errors

Returning a freed pointer

```
/* fs/proc/generic.c:proc_symlink */
ent->data = kmalloc(...);
if (!ent->data) {
    kfree(ent);
    goto out;
}
out:
return ent;
```



Deallocation Errors

```
/* drivers/block/cciss.c:cciss ioctl */
if (iocommand.Direction == XFER WRITE) {
   if (copy_to_user(...)) {
         cmd free (NULL, c);
         if (buff != NULL) kfree(buff);
         return ( -EFAULT);
if (iocommand.Direction == XFER READ) {
     if (copy_to_user(...)) {
         cmd_free(NULL, c);
         kfree (buff);
cmd free(NULL, c);
if (buff != NULL) kfree(buff);
```



Finding a-b Pairs

- a(); ... b(); implies a MAY belief that a() must always be followed by b()
- Assume all a-b sequences are valid
 - Note: use latent specifications and prefiltering to restrict to likely pairs
- Scan for all function calls
 - "check" for each a() ... b() sequence
 - "error" for all lone a() calls
- Rank errors
- Found 23 errors and 11 false positives



Finding a-b Pairs

```
drivers/sound/trident.c:trident_release:
lock_kernel();
card = state->card;
dmabuf = &state->dmabuf;
VALIDATE_STATE(state);
```

 Kernel lock not always released on some error paths within VALIDATE_STATE(state);



Finding a-b Pairs

```
/* drivers/sound/esssolo1.c:solo1_midi_release */
static int solo1_midi_release(...) {
  lock_kernel();
  if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
       add_wait_queue(&s->midi.owait, &wait);
      for (;;) {
          __set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
          spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
          count = s->midi.ocnt;
          spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
          if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
              remove_wait_queue(...);
              set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
              /* did not release lock! */
              return -EBUSY;
    unlock_kernel();
   return 0;
```

Possible to return without releasing Kernel lock



Summary

- Extract code beliefs, find errors without knowing the truth
 - MUST belief contradictions are errors
 - MAY beliefs should be treated as MUST beliefs and then ranked by their confidence rating
- Flag areas with redundancy/useless code
 - High chance of error
 - Could be a typo
 - Programmer confusion could mean errors are nearby